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Article 8

et al.: Workers' Compensation: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine

WORKERS' COMPENSATION: THE
DUAL-CAPACITY DOCTRINE
Under workers' compensation statutes, an employee generally is barredfrom suing
his employer. The dual-capacity doctrine, however, allows an employee to sue his
employer if that employer occupies a capacity with duties and obligations that are
independent of the employee-employer relatonship. To date, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not considered the dual-capacity doctrine. Employees have asserted eight capacities that may establish an independent duty. This Note will
examine each of those capacities and make specific recommendations on whether
Minnesota should adopt the dual-capacity doctrine.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

"The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive
" MINN.
and in the place of any other liability to such employee ...
STAT. § 176.031 (1978).
The exclusive-remedy provision of a workers' compensation act generally is a bar to all tort actions by an employee against an employer.,
Under workers' compensation statutes, the employee has sacrified the
1. See Note, Dual Capacity DOcinne: Third-Party Liabiity of Employer-Manufacturer in
ProductsLiability Litigation, 12 IND. L. REV. 553, 556-57 (1979); Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suabiity." The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L. . 818, 818-19
(1974).
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sometimes uncertain common-law remedy for employment-related injuries in return for the almost certain recovery of workers' compensation
benefits regardless of employer fault. 2 As with virtually all other jurisdictions, 3 Minnesota has an exclusive-remedy provision in its Workers'
4
Compensation Act.
In recent years, however, several jurisdictions have developed a common-law exception to the exclusive-remedy provision.5 A number of authorities have labeled this theory the "dual-capacity doctrine."6
According to Professor Larson, under the dual-capacity doctrine:
[A]n employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive
remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he
occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity
that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him
as employer.
The decisive dual-capacity test is not concerned with how separate
or different the second function of the employer is from the first but
with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to
7
those flowing from the first, that of employer.
Twenty-seven jurisdictions have addressed the principles underlying
the dual-capacity doctrine.8 The emergence of the dual-capacity doctrine has caused a reevaluation of the principles underlying workers'
compensation legislation.9
The primary purpose of workers' compensation legislation is to benefit
an employee by allowing the recovery of minimum benefits for workrelated injuries without a showing of employer fault.1o In addition, such
legislation provides an employee with a relatively speedy remedy without
2. See note 1 supra.
3. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
12-1 to -3 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
4. See MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1978).

COMPENSATION,

§§ 65.00-.10, at

5. See notes 8-9 infra and accompanying text. See generalp 2A A. LARSON, supra note
3, § 72.80.
6. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80; Note, supra note 1, at 553-55; Comment,
supra note 1, at 821-24. Cases involving the dual-capacity doctrine should be distinguished from those holding that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment and from those holding that the defendant was an entity separate from the
employer. See Comment, supra, at 559-60. But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'r Corp., 254 Ark.
17, 491 S.W.2d 778 (1973) (joint venture held not to be separate legal entity from the
parties of which it was comprised).
7. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-112, 14-117.
8. These jurisdictions are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.
9. See Note, supra note 1, at 553.
10. See id'. at 556.
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protracted and often unsuccessful litigation.t With increasing frequency, however, employees have found that the.exclusive-remedy provision effectively shields employers against the full economic liability that
the common law would have imposed. 12
Application of the dual-capacity doctrine depends upon the finding of
duties and obligations that arise outside of the employment relationship.
To be liable, an employer must act in a capacity other than that of an
employer. 13 By suing the employer based upon a legal relationship distinct from the employer-employee relationship, the exclusive-remedy
provision is avoided in jurisdictions that accept the doctrine. Tojustify a
common-law action against an employer, injured employees have asserted that the employer acted in one or more of the following eight capacities:
1) Manufacturer or distributor of a defective product
2) Provider of medical services
3) Insurer
4) Corporate subdivision or related corporation
5) Government subdivision
6) Owner of real estate
11. See ia'. at 556-57. One author estimated that prior to the workers' compensation
acts 80% of all common-law actions by employees were unsuccessful. Id. (citing B.
SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 1.2, at 3 (1950)).
12. See Note, supra note 1,at 553-54. See generally Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's
Compensation Remedy- The Employee's Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 555 (1963).
Professor Larson has distinguished the recoveries available under common-law tort
actions and workers' compensation statutes. Under workers' compensation statutes, damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium are not recoverable, even though these
damages may be a substantial portion of a tort recovery. I A. LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 2.40 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980). Professor Larson states that "It was never intended
that [workers'] compensation payments should equal actual loss, for the reason, if no
other, that such a scale would encourage malingering." Id. § 2.50, at 12. Furthermore,
Professor Larson asserts that compensation ceilings result in substantial undercompensation of higher-paid employees. Id. Professor Larson has observed that "the amount of
compensation awarded may be expected to go not much higher than is necessary to keep
the worker from destitution. That is indeed so." Id. at 11.
13. The United States Supreme Court in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S.
418 (1923), stated:
Workmen's Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that
of implied contract; that is, upon the conception that the injured workman is
entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in the service of an industry to
whose operations he contributes his work as the owner contributes his capitalthe one for the sake of wages and the other for the sake of profits. The liability is
based, not upon any act or omission of the employer, but upon the existence of
the relationship which the employee bears to the employment because of and in
the course of which he has been injured.
Id. at 423. The Ohio Supreme Court used this language as the basis for an analysis of the
dual-capacity doctrine. Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 186, 378
N.E.2d 488, 490 (1978) (hospital employee allowed to bring suit under dual-capacity doctrine for failure of employer-hospital to diagnose mercury poisoning).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 8
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

7)
8)

[Vol. 6

Vendor
Statutory duty not imposed by a workers' compensation act.

This Note will examine each of these capacities, the duties that arise
under them, and the success of each in bringing about the acceptance of
the dual-capacity doctrine.
II.

ORIGIN OF THE DUAL-CAPACITY DOCTRINE

The 1952 California case of Duprey v. Shanel4 is considered to be the
first decision to have adopted the dual-capacity doctrine, even though
the court did not expressly refer to the doctrine. 15 In Duprey the plaintiff
was a nurse who received injuries to her neck and body in the course of
her employment. The plaintiff's employer, a chiropractor, treated the
plaintiff's injury. As a result of the negligent administration of the treatment, the plaintiff experienced further disability. The plaintiff received
workers' compensation benefits and brought a common-law action
against her employer for the aggravated injuries.16
Defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over a claim arising under the workers' compensation statute. The California Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention and
held that the case was one that was against "a person other than an
employer."1 7 The court stated that when a doctor-employer elects to
14. 109 Cal. App. 2d 586, 241 P.2d 78, aftd, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
15. See Comment, supra note 1, at 822. Cases that arose prior to Duprey generally
rejected any attempt by an employee to maintain a suit against the employer. See, e.g.,
Walker v. City & County of San Francisco, 97 Cal. App. 2d 901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950) (city
fire department employee killed by city-owned and operated streetcar); DeStefano v. Al-

pha Lunch Co., 308 Mass. 38, 30 N.E.2d 827 (1941) (restaurant employees' food poisoning); Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 714 (1933) (city fire department
employee injured by city-owned and operated streetcar); Winter v. Peter Doelger Brewing
Co., 175 A.D. 796, 162 N.Y.S. 469 (1916) (employee injured by employer-owned defective

elevator that was primarily used in employer's other business), aJ'dmem., 226 N.Y. 581,
123 N.E. 895 (1919); De Giuseppe v. City of New York, 188 Misc. 897, 66 N.Y.S.2d 866
(Sup. Ct. 1946) (city sanitation department employee killed by city-owned and operated

trolley car), af'dmem., 273 A.D. 1010, 79 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1948). But see Volk v. City of New
York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940) (common-law action by nurse against hospital
for negligent treatment after becoming ill on duty held not barred by the workers' compensation statute).
Those jurisdictions that rejected the principles of the dual-capacity doctrine in early
cases eventually reversed their positions and recognized the dual-capacity doctrine. See,

e.g., Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977)
(employee injured by defective scaffolding manufactured by employer); Panagos v. North
Detroit Gen. Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971) (hospital employee cut
mouth on food purchased in hospital cafeteria); Stevens v. County of Nassau, 56 A.D.2d

866, 392 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1977) (mem.) (hospital employee injured on hospital grounds and
treated at hospital emergency room and orthopedic clinic).
16. 39 Cal. 2d at 784-89, 249 P.2d at 10-13.
17. Id. at 789-94, 249 P.2d at 13-16.
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treat a work-related injury, the doctor-employer's responsibility is the
same as that of any other doctor.' 8 According to the Duprey majority, to
allow a professional such as a doctor to avoid such liability would encourage quackery. ' 9
The Duprey court also rejected defendant's argument that a decision in
the plaintiff's favor would have required a dual legal personality that the
law is loath to impose on a party. The court stated that defendant had
two relationships toward the plaintiff, that of employer and physician,
and that the distinction was realistic, not legalistic.20 Even though the

Duprey court did not expressly use the phrase "dual-capacity doctrine,"
2
the principles of the doctrine were clearly delineated. '
In 1963 the United States Supreme Court addressed the principles underlying the dual-capacity doctrine in Reedy. Yaka.2 2 The plaintiff's employer, a stevedoring company, operated the steamship Yaka under a
bareboat charter. Under such a charter, the full possession and control
of the ship is conveyed to the charterer. Although plaintiff's employer
was not the owner of the ship, under admiralty law a bareboat charterer
is treated as the owner and is liable for the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
While unloading the ship, the plaintiff was injured because of a defect in
a pallet. Plaintiff obtained compensation under the Longshoreman's and
Harbor

Workers'

Compensation

Act 23

(Longshoreman's

Act)

and

brought a common-law action against the employer for operating an unseaworthy ship.
The defendant asserted that the exclusive-remedy provision of the
Longshoreman's Act, which is virtually identical to that found in workers' compensation acts, 24 barred the common-law action. The Court rejected the defendant's position, citing two previous Supreme Court cases
25
that held a shipowner's obligation of seaworthiness to be nondelegable.
The Court pointed out that if the plaintiff had been employed by an
independent stevedoring company, he could have recovered against the
shipowner. 26 The majority reasoned that an employee's need for protection from unseaworthy ships is the same whether the longshoreman
18. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
19. Id. at 791, 249 P.2d at 14.

20. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
21. Duprey is still good law. See Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 455 (1972) (action against company physician for malpractice in aggravation of
employee's industrially-incurred injury upheld under Duprey).

22.
23.
24.
clusive

373 U.S. 410 (1963).
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-941, 944-950 (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
The Longshoreman's Act provides that the liability of an employer "shall be exand in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee ......
33

U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976).
25. 373 U.S. at 410-11, 413-16 (citing Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) and Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)).

26. Id. at 414.
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works for a stevedoring company or for the owner of a vessel, and all
employees are entitled to like treatment under the law.2 7 According to
the majority, blind adherence to the Longshoreman's Act would result in
a disregard of the employer's duty as a shipowner.28 Subsequent federal
cases indicate that Reed is still good law.29

The following discussion consists of a state-by-state analysis of the
dual-capacity doctrine in the context of each of the eight dual capacities.
The continued validity and growth of the dual-capacity doctrine will be
examined, along with the likelihood of Minnesota's adoption of the dualcapacity doctrine.
III.
A.

PARTICULAR CAPACITIES

Manufacturer or Distributorof Defective Products

In recent years, strict liability for defective products has gained almost
nationwide acceptance. 30 Strict liability has emerged partly because the
consumer, faced with increasingly complex products, is forced to rely on
the manufacturer to supply reasonably safe goods. 3 1 In addition, the
manufacturer is considered to be better able to bear and spread the costs
associated with defective products. 32 Furthermore, strict liability is im27. Id. at 415.
28. The Court stated: "[Oinly blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute
could prompt us to ignore the fact that . . . [the] employer of [a] longshoreman . . . was
also a bareboat charterer . . . charged with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable
obligation of seaworthiness which it should not be permitted to avoid." Id.
29. See Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, 546 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1977); Napoli v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521
F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. dened, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); In re Allied Towing Corp., 416 F.
Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1976); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp.
402 (E.D. La. 1974). But see Lucas v. "Brinkness" Schiffahrte Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (dicta). For a succinct discussion of the history behind the Longshoreman's Act,
the case law interpreting it, and how subsequent amendments to the Longshoreman's Act
have affected that case law, see Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, 546 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1977).
The relationship between state workers' compensation law and a federal unseaworthiness claim was explored in Barber v. New Englanda Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973).
In Barber the court held that a longshoreman who was injured in the course of employment and collected state workers' compensation benefits was not precluded from bringing
an action for unseaworthiness. Id.
30. Strict liability for defective products was first adopted in California in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Since
Yuba at least 38 jurisdictions have adopted strict tort liability for defective products. See I
R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1979). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Stinc Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
Minnesota adopted the doctrine of strict liability in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,
278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (child severely burned when room vaporizer
tipped over).
31. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 799-800.
32. Id. In McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967),
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posed on manufacturers to deter the production of defective goods. 33 Because the duty of a manufacturer to supply defect-free products arises
independently of any employer-employee relationship, the issue arises
whether employees should be allowed to bring a strict products liability
action against employers.
1.

Adoption of the Doctrine

Only three jurisdictions, California, Illinois, and Ohio, have expressly
applied the dual-capacity doctrine to products liability actions. In Douglas v. E. &J. Gallo W"ner,34 the plaintiff brought a common-law action
against his employer for the defective construction of a scaffold. 35 A California court of appeals held that the plaintiff could bring an action
against the manufacturer even though the plaintiff's injuries arose out of
and in the course of his employment.36 The court, however, placed a
restriction on the dual-capacity doctrine in a products liability suit: the
product in question must be manufactured by the employer for sale to
3
the general public and not merely for the sole use of the employer. 7
the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed some of the policy reasons for adopting strict
liability:
[I]n our view, enlarging a manufacturer's liability to those injured by its products more adequately meets public policy demands to protect consumers from
the inevitable risks of bodily harm created by mass production and complex
marketing conditions. In a case such as this, subjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of negligence or privity of contract, as the rule intends, imposes
the cost of injury resulting from a defective product upon the maker, who can
both most effectively reduce or eliminate the hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs, instead of upon the consumer, who possesses neither
the skill nor the means necessary to protect himself adequately from either the
risk of injury or its disastrous consequences.
Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
33. See Douglas v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 113,137 Cal. Rptr. 797,
803 (1977); Note, supra note 1, at 580-81; Comment, supra note 1, at 832 & n.76.
34. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
35. Id. at 106, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
36. Id. at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
The most recent California case to deal with the dual-capacity doctrine in a products
liability context is Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., - Cal. App. 3d -, 163 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980) (defective plastic crates causing employee's injury sold to limited partnership employer by general and managing partner, remanded for further proceedings).
37. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799. The principle in Douglas that the
dual-capacity doctrine does not apply to an employer who manufactures a defective product that is not sold to the general public was foreshadowed in Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975) and Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59
Cal. App. 3d 978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976). In Williams the defendant-employer allegedly designed and manufactured a defective spraying machine for use by its employees.
The court barred the products liability suit against the employer for injuries arising out of
the use of the spraying machine because the machines were manufactured solely for use by
the employees, not for sale to the public. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 121, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 814. In
Shook the court held that the exclusive-remedy provision barred an action by an employee
injured by a machine that the employer designed and manufactured. 57 Cal. App. 3d at
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The Douglas court viewed its holding as a logical application of Duprey
v. Shane.38 The court stated that when an employer is.a manufacturer
selling to the public, that employer assumes all of the duties and liabilities of a manufacturer. The mere fact that the injured party happens to
be an employee is of no consequence; the obligations of a manufacturer
are independent of the obligations of an employer.39 According to the
Douglas court, the workers' compensation laws were not intended to deprive an employee of the full protection of the law.40

The court noted that because the workers' compensation laws were
enacted before strict products liability actions were recognized, and because an employer can be indirectly liable to an employee through a
series of indemnity actions, it would be grossly unfair to provide an em1
ployer-manufacturer with immunity from suit. 4 According to the Doug-

las court, extending the dual-capacity doctrine to allow a strict products
liability action against the employer did not controvert the policies underlying either the workers' compensation statute or strict products liability actions. Instead, the decision comported with those policies.42
Furthermore, the Douglas court rejected the notion that its decision
might cripple the workers' compensation system; Duprey had produced
no noticeable adverse effect in twenty-five years and Douglas was merely
43
the logical extension of Duprey.
The second court to apply the dual-capacity doctrine in a products
44
liability case was the Ohio Court of Appeals in Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc.
In Mercer the plaintiff's services as a truck driver had been "leased" to the
defendant Uniroyal. Uniroyal provided a vehicle that was leased from
Avis and that coincidentally had Uniroyal tires. A defect in one of the
front tires caused the tire to blow out, resulting in an accident that injured the plaintiff. Under Ohio law, the plaintiff was deemed to be the
980-82, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98. Because the employer created the machine for its own
use on its own plant and premises, the court stated that pursuant to § 402A, comment f of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the employer was not subject to strict tort liability. Id. at
981, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 498. The court also stated that "[a]ttempts to extend the rule of
Dupr have been repeatedly rejected . . .... Id. at 980, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98. A
Minnesota district court adopted the Douglas rule in Netherland v. Acme Tag Co., No.
753534 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 1979). For a discussion of Netherland, see notes 93-96
tn6ra and accompanying text.
38. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). For a full discussion of Dupre,, see notes 14-21
supra and accompanying text.
39. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 107-08, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
40. Id. at 112, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 112-13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
43. Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803; accordRosalesv. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 111.
App. 3d 787, 798, 354 N.E.2d 553, 562 (1976) (Simon, J., dissenting).
44. 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
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employee of the defendant Uniroyal. 45 In this case of first impression,
the Ohio court held that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Ohio
Worker's Compensation Act did not bar the plaintiff's products liability
action. 46 The court stated that the tire's having been manufactured by
the defendant would not prevent recovery because the hazard was not
necessarily one of employment, but was common to the public in general. 4 7 Furthermore, because the statute failed to recognize the unique

problems raised by defective products in the work place, and because the
statute also failed specifically to eliminate a products liability cause of
action, the Mercer court refused to bar plaintiff's product liability ac48
tion.
The dissent in Mercer argued that the dual-capacity doctrine was contrary to Ohio law and that when the plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits, he exhausted his remedies. 49 The fundamental stance of
the dissent was that acceptance of the dual-capacity doctrine should be
through legislative action, not judicial actionSO
In 1979 the Illinois Supreme Court clarified a long line of lower court
cases 5 ' when it adopted the dual-capacity doctrine in a products liability
context. In Smith v. Metropohtan Sanita, District,52 two companies formed

a joint venture for the purpose of undertaking a
One of the joint venturers leased a truck with a
brake to the joint venture. Because of this defect,
the employee's legs, resulting in their amputation.
Plaintiff charged the defendant with violations

construction project.
defective emergency
the truck rolled onto
of the Illinois Struc-

tural Work Act, 53 negligence, and strict products liability. The court

held that the Structural Work Act claim and the negligence action were
barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.

54

45. Id. at 280, 361 N.E.2d at 493-94.
46. Id. at 286, 361 N.E.2d at 496.
47. Id. at 285, 361 N.E.2d at 496.
48. Id. at 282-85, 361 N.E.2d at 495-96. Professor Larson has stated that it is a "well
established principle that obliteration of a valuable and longstanding cause of action
should not be found except when statutory language destroying the cause of action is
clear; any doubt, then, should be resolved in favor of preserving rather than abolishing
that right." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80 at 14-122 to -123.

49. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 286, 361 N.E.2d at 497 (Wiley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
50.

Id. at 290, 361 N.E.2d at 499 (Wiley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

Professor Larson argues that Mercer and Douglas are unsound applications of the dualcapacity doctrine. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-112 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
For a rebuttal of this argument, see notes 91-92 i'nfta and accompanying text.
51. See notes 122-28 infra and accompanying text.
52. 77 III. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
54. 77 II1.2d at 319-20, 396 N.E.2d at 527. Prior to Sntah, Illinois had not rejected
the dual-capacity doctrine in a products liability setting. See Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 I11.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 8
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

The court, however, held that the strict products liability action was
not barred because the defendant, when it leased the allegedly defective
truck to the joint venture, occupied a dual capacity with respect to the
employee: employer and product distributor.55 As a result, the court
56
held the defendant could be sued as the lessor of a defective vehicle.
App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977). But see Sago v. Amax Aluminum Mill Prods., Inc.,
67 I1. App. 3d 271, 385 N.E.2d 17 (1979) (dual-capacity doctrine recognized in Illinois but
is strictly construed); Profilet v. Falconite, 56 Il. App. 3d 168, 371 N.E.2d 1069 (1977)
(employer's leasing unreasonably dangerous crane does not give rise to second capacity);
Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 111. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976) (removal
of safety devices on punch press does not make employer a "quasi-manufacturer").
In Wnkler the plaintiff was injured when cargo fell from a lift truck manufactured by
the defendant employer. The plaintiff sued the employer alleging defective design and
manufacture and failure to warn. The Wtnkler court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, holding that a product manufactured by an employer for use in the employer's business did
not satisfy the "sale into the stream of commerce" requirement for a products liability suit.
Id. at 287, 369 N.E.2d at 610. The dissent saw this holding merely as a means to avoid the
application of the dual-capacity doctrine, which had been previously recognized in Illinois
in another context. Id. at 288-90, 369 N.E.2d at 610-11 (Craven, P.J., dissenting); see
Marcus v. Green, 13 Il. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (1973); notes 122-28 infra and accompanying text.
Some doubt exists whether the Winkler majority fully understood the dual-capacity
doctrine. The majority referred to the dual-capacity doctrine as the "dual purpose doctrine" four different times in its relatively short opinion. 54 Ill. App. 3d at 283-85, 369
N.E.2d at 607-08. Only once was the dual-capacity doctrine referred to as the "dual capacity doctrine." Id. at 284, 369 N.E.2d at 608. In workers' compensation law, the dualpurpose doctrine relates exclusively to the course of employment issue. I A. LARSON, supra
note 3, at § 18 (1978). It is used to determine whether a trip made by an employer that
has both a business and a personal purpose is to be accorded business trip status. See id.
This confusion of concepts by the Winkler majority may indicate that the majority did not
entirely understand, arid as a result, did not fully address the dual-capacity issue. Presiding Justice Craven's dissent implies such a conclusion. See 54 II1. App. 3d at 288-90, 369
N.E.2d at 610-12 (Craven, P.J., dissenting).
In accordance with the majority opinions in Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App.
2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1977) (see notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text) and Douglas
v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) (see notes 34-43
supra and accompanying text), the 4inzkler dissent stated that the workers' compensation
statute was designed as a substitute for previous rights of action against an employer. 54
Ill. App 3d at 288, 369 N.E.2d at 611 (Craven, P.J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that
since the action for strict products liability was recognized after the enactment of the
workers' compensation statute, the statute would not destroy the strict liability action. Id.
Furthermore, according to the dissent, an employee cannot be expected to assume the risk
of defective products when entering the employment relationship. Id. at 289, 369 N.E.2d
at 611 (Craven, P.J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent asserted that the policy goals of
strict liability should not be subverted and that to deny the action would give an employer
more protection than envisioned by the statute. Id. (Craven, P.J., dissenting).
55. 77 I11.2d at 320, 396 N.E.2d at 528. The lower court in Smith v. Metropolitan
Sanitary Dist., 61 111. App. 3d 103, 377 N.E.2d 1088 (1978), sidestepped the dual-capacity
issue by holding that the lessor of the truck was not plaintiffs employer and therefore was
subject to suit. Id. at 107, 377 N.E.2d at 1090.
56. 77 111.2d at 321, 396 N.E.2d at 528. One of the most significant aspects of Smith is
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One thing is clear from the decisions accepting the dual-capacity doctrine: the employer must be in the business of manufacturing or distributing the defective product. This rule, which was established in Douglas,
also may explain several of the decisions that have rejected the dualcapacity doctrine.57
2. Reection of the Doctrine
Three jurisdictions, Arkansas, Indiana, and North Dakota, have expressly rejected the dual-capacity doctrine in a products liability con59
text. 58 In the 1973 Arkansas case of Lewis v. Gardner Engineering Corp.,
that Marcus v. Green, 13 I11.
App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (1973), is cited with approval.
77 I11.
2d'at 319, 396 N.E.2d at 528. Cases subsequent to Marcus had nearly limited Marcus
out of existence. See notes 125-28 infia and accompanying text. Smitlh apparently has
revived Marcus and the dual-capacity doctrine in Illinois. See McCormick v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 82 I11.
App. 3d 77, 402 N.E.2d 412 (1980) (application of dual-capacity doctrine; company physician).
The dual-capacity doctrine in Illinois was refined further by Goetz v. Avildsen Tool
& Machs., Inc., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1980). In Goetz the plaintiff-employee was injured by an automatic drill hopper that had been manufactured by one of
the defendant's employees. The court rejected the application of the dual-capacity doctrine because the employer was not in the business of selling these machines to the public.
Id. at 1059-62, 403 N.E.2d at 560-62.
57. Latendresse v. Preskey, 290 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D. 1980) (defective steel pin
manufactured by employer not sold or made for the general public); see Kottis v. United
States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying Indiana law) (employer only
participant in manufacture of defective crane; no indication employer was in business of
manufacturing cranes); Lewis v. Gardner Eng'r Corp., 254 Ark. 137, 491 S.W.2d 778
(1973) (no indication employer was in business of manufacturing pile drivers); Needham
v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 359 N.E.2d 544 (Ind.App. 1977) (employer in frozen food
business; not business of manufacturing pressure cookers); Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors,
Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1978) (no indication wire winder manufactured by employer
was sold to general public).
58. Massachusetts recently joined those jurisdictions that have rejected the use of the
dual-capacity doctrine in products liability cases. In Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass,
Inc., - Mass. -, 408 N.E.2d 857 (1980), an employee was injured by defective machinery
manufactured by a separate division of the employer. The court held that the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act barred the employee from suing the employer, and
that the dual-capacity doctrine was not applicable because the defective product was a
routine and integral part of the employment. Id. In addition, the court held that "separate divisions are insufficient to establish dual capacity." Id. at -, 408 N.E.2d at 859.
This case is significant because the injury-causing product was also sold to the general
public. Id. at -, 408 N.E.2d at 858. Therefore, the rejection of the dual-capacity doctrine
in the products liability context is unequivocal. The Longever court, however, expressly left
open the question whether the dual-capacity doctrine might be adopted in some other
context. Id. at - n.7, 408 N.E.2d at 860 n.7.
Several dual-capacity cases involve defective products, but the decisions do not address the policies involved in the products liability context. See Stone v. United States
Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1980) (defective chemical vat; dual-capacity doctrine held
to have application); Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp., 150 N.J. Super. 48, 374 A.2d 1222
(1977) (defective chemical vat; dual-capacity doctrine rejected); Cooper v. Queen, 586

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

11

William Mitchell
LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 6,LAW
Iss. 3 [1980],
Art. 8
REVIEW
WILLIAM

[Vol. 6

the plaintiff was an employee of a corporation that had entered into a
joint venture with the defendant on a construction project. A defect in a
pile driver manufactured by the defendant caused some steel pilings to
fall on and injure the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant, arguing that the defendant should be estopped from invoking the exclusive-remedy provision to escape strict liability for the
manufacture of a defective product. Without citing any authority, the
Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument as being without merit.60
The dissent argued for the application of the dual-capacity doctrine,
commenting that "It was never intended that our workmen's compensation statutes should immunize one who happens to be an employer from
any and all liablity to one who happens to be his employee."61
In Indiana the dual-capacity doctrine was put to rest by cases in the
Seventh Circuit and in the Indiana Court of Appeals. In the Seventh
Circuit case, Kottis v. United States Steel Corp.,62 plaintiff's decedent was
killed in the course of employment while performing duties as a
craneman for the defendant. The plaintiff obtained workers' compensation benefits and brought suit against the employer under the dual-capacity theory, contending that the crane had been defectively
manufactured.63 The court, applying Indiana law, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that to allow a
common-law products liability suit against the employer in situations in
which the employment relationship predominates would make devastating inroads into the Indiana workers' compensation scheme and that it
was up to the Indiana Legislature to make a decision involving such farreaching implications.64 One year later, in Needham v. Fred'sFrozen Foods,
Inc.,65 the Indiana Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of Kottis and
held that the clear language of the workers' compensation statute pre66
cluded the adoption of the dual-capacity doctrine.
The last jurisdiction to reject the dual-capacity doctrine in a products
liability context was North Dakota. In the 1978 case of Schlenk v. Aerial
S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. App. 1979) (fiberglass insulators removed from steel cables on tree
trimming apparatus, employee electrocuted; dual-capacity doctrine held to have application).
59. 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778 (1973).
60. Id. at 18-20, 491 S.W.2d at 778-80.
61. Id. at 26, 491 S.W.2d at 783 (Fogleman, J., dissenting). The dissent quotes extensively from Professor Larson's treatise.
62. 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying Indiana law).
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 26.
65. 359 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. App. 1977) (employee sprayed with scalding grease from
erupting pressure cooker that was designed, manufactured, and installed by employer).
66. Id. at 545.
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Contractors, Inc. ,67 the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment as a telephone lineman. The plaintiff brought a products liability
suit against his employer, alleging negligent design and manufacture of
the wire winder that caused his injury.68 Without any analysis, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the exclusive-remedy provision
69
did not allow the application of the dual-capacity doctrine.
In Latendresse v. Presky,70 the North Dakota Supreme Court once again
rejected an employee's attempt to bring a products liability action
against his employer. The plaintiff-employee was injured while installing a defective steel pin manufactured by the employer. The court rejected the dual-capacity doctrine, citing both the exclusive-remedy
provision and Professor Larson, who takes the position that Douglas and
. "71
Mercer are "unsound applications of the dual-capacity concept
The court noted that even if it were to follow Douglas the employer still
would be immune from suit because the product was not for sale to the
72
public.
3.

Dual Capacity-An Open Question

In six jurisdictions, Alabama, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New York, and South Carolina, the applicability of the dual-capacity
doctrine in a products liability suit is still an open question. These courts
found that the facts presented to them did not provide an opportunity to
apply the doctrine.
In the Alabama Supreme Court case of Mapson v. Montgomery White
Trucks, Inc.,73 a repairman employed by the defendant, a truck dealership, was injured when a truck he was repairing rolled over. The repairman brought suit against the employer, alleging that a defect in the
truck caused the injury and that the employer should be held liable as a
seller of defective goods under the dual-capacity doctrine. The Mapson
court dismissed the suit, stating that the facts did not allow consideration
of the merits of the dual-capacity doctrine because the compensation
statute expressly held employers immune from liability for employmentrelated accidents.74 Because the dual-capacity doctrine applies only to
employment-related accidents and because the Mapson court left the
dual-capacity question open in a case that provided a prime opportunity
75
to address the issue, the intent of the Mapson court is unclear at best.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1978).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 474.
290 N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1980).
Id. at 270-71; 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-112 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
290 N.W.2d at 271.
357 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 1978).
Id. at 972.
But see Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1980) (dual-capac-

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 8
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 6

Two federal cases applying Louisiana law and South Carolina law declined to address the issue since the respective state courts had not ruled
on the dual-capacity doctrine. 76
In Minnesota, the applicability of the dual-capacity doctrine to products liability cases was left undecided in Netherland. acme Tag Co. 77 Full
discussion of this case appears later in this Note.78
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in DePaolo v. Spauldng Fibre Co. ,79
held that an employee could not sue his employer for injuries the employee sustained while operating an allegedly defective heating
fabrication machine designed and manufactured by the employer. Because the machine was designed and built for use solely in the employer's
plant, the DePaolo court found that dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action
was proper under Douglas.80 Even though the court relied on the reasoning in Douglas, the dual-capacity doctrine was not mentioned. 8' Therefore, acceptance of the doctrine in New Hampshire is still an open
question.
The dual-capacity doctrine question remains undecided in New York
as well. Bil v. ConsolidatedMachine Tool Corp.82 involved an employee
who was struck by a ram that was part of a mill he was repairing in the
course of his employment. The mill and the allegedly defective parts
were manufactured by corporations that later were merged into the employer's corporation. The plaintiff argued that the policy aims of strict
products liability should be promoted whether the manufacturer supplies
the defective product to an employee or to a member of the general pubity doctrine rejected); Adair v. Moretti-Harrah Marble Co., 381 So. 2d 181 (Ala. 1980)
(same).
76. See Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 347 F.2d 371 (5th Cir.
1965) (applying Louisiana law) (employee injured while using hoist manufactured by employer); Strickland v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 326 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying South Carolina law) (employee's hair caught in moving wheel of zipper machine manufactured by
employer).
Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the dual-capacity doctrine in
Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., - S.C. -, 267 S.E.2d 524 (1980). In Parker the
employee was fatally injured when roof trusses collapsed. The court stated that
"[a]ssuming without deciding that there are instances where the dual capacity doctrine
could be applied, it is clear ... the doctrine is inapplicable." Id. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 529.
The court appears to reject the dual-capacity doctrine. Stating that to allow recovery
would make employers' liability uncertain and indeterminate, the court declined "to make
such a substantial inroad into [the] statutory compensation scheme." Id. Even though
this language may constitute dicta, such a strong declaration of distaste for the dual-capacity doctrine surely will appear in subsequent cases.
77. No. 753534 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 1979).
78. See notes 93-96 infra and accompanying text.
79. - N.H. -, 397 A.2d 1048 (1979).
80. Id. at -, 397 A.2d at 1049.
81. Id.
82. 71 A.D.2d 796, 419 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1979) (mem.).
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lic.83 The Billy court, however, noting that New York has not adopted
the dual-capacity doctrine, stated that "if a change is to be made, it
84
should be done by the Court of Appeals."
4. Summay
Although courts disagree on whether the dual-capacity doctrine
should be applied to products liability suits against employers, the adoption of dual capacity under the Douglas rule is the better reasoned approach. To allow an employer to use the exclusive-remedy provision of
the workers' compensation statutes as a shield against products liability
suits is not in accord with the intent and purpose of workers' compensation acts, nor does it promote the policies underlying strict products liability. Both workers' compensation acts and strict products liability
principles attempt to place the cost of industrial accidents and productrelated injuries on the party best able to bear and spread the cost.8 5 To
grant an employer immunity from employee-initiated products liability
suits results in the employee obtaining only the generally incomplete economic recovery granted under workers' compensation acts. 86 As a result,
the employee, not the employer, bears the cost of injuries caused by defective products; the employee is treated less favorably than the general
public.
The rejection of the dual-capacity doctrine in the products liability
context violates a basic principle of workers' compensation statutes, the
concept of a quid pro quo.8 7 Generally, an employee injured in the
course of employment by a defective product has a right to a cause of
action against the manufacturer in addition to workers' compensation
benefits. If the employer also is the manufacturer and the dual-capacity
doctrine is rejected, the employee's products liability action is erased by
the broad construction of the exclusive-remedy provision. Workers' compensation statutes were enacted to insure an employee of recovery for
work-related accidents, and in return the employee gave up the right to a
cause of action against the employer for those accidents. There is no
indication that workers' compensation acts were intended to eliminate
83. Id. at 796, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
84. Id. The Bily court's observation is not totally accurate. In Cline v. Avery Abrasives, Inc., 96 Misc. 2d 258, 409 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (action against employer's
workmen's compensation insurer for negligent inspection), the court stated in dicta, based
on a line of New York cases, that under the dual-capacity doctrine an employee can sue
the employer-hospital for the aggravation of injuries sustained in the course of employment when the treatment given to the employee is available generally to members of the
public. Id. at 267, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
85. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 12 supra.
87. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 65.10, at 12-3 to -4.
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products liability suits.88 If the dual-capacity doctrine is rejected, the
employee is forced to give up the right to sue for injuries caused by defective products and gets nothing in return. The employer has a great deal
to gain if the dual-capacity doctrine is rejected; overall liability is decreased if those products also are used in the employer's business or businesses. Given the growing domination of business conglomerates that are
in many respects self-sufficient because they are able to satisfy many of
their own product needs, workers' compensation acts may effectively
9
eradicate a substantial number of products liability suits.8 Furthermore, rejection of the dual-capacity doctrine would not serve to deter

employers from manufacturing and using unsafe products because the
employer would be protected by benefit limits.90
In contrast to the views expressed above, Professor Larson asserts that
Douglas is an unsound application of the dual-capacity doctrine because
the use of the product was a routine and integral part of the employment. 9 1 Whether a product is a routine and integral part of the employment, however, is irrelevant under the dual-capacity doctrine as
formulated by Professor Larson. The only issue is whether the second

capacity generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the employment relationship.92
The Douglas rule is a logical limitation of the dual-capacity doctrine.
The Douglas rule ensures that only employers who are in the business of
manufacturing the injury-causing product for sale to the public will be
88. See, e.g., Douglas v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 110-11, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 797, 801 (1977); Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 11. App. 3d 787, 797-98, 354
N.E.2d 553, 561 (1976) (Simon, J., dissenting); Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d
279, 283-84, 361 N.E.2d 492, 495 (1977); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-122 to
-123.
89. See notes 143-50 infra and accompanying text.
90. Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797,
803 (1977). Justice Simon, dissenting in Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 11. App.
3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976), in which an employer who removed safety devices on a
punch press that injured an employee was held not to be a quasi-manufacturer, argued
compellingly for application of the dual-capacity doctrine in products liability cases. Justice Simon stated that denying employees recovery against employers who manufacture
defective products deprives a class of plaintiffs of the safeguards that the law requires of
manufacturers. Id. at 798, 354 N.E.2d at 561-62 (Simon, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
Justice Simon argued that a manufacturer-employer who removes safety devices should
not be shielded by a humane law (the workers' compensation act), especially when such
modifications were made to increase profits, and he observed that the workers' compensation scheme has survived even though Illinois law, by authorizing third-party suits against
employers, allows employees to recover indirectly from their employers. Id. (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
The counterargument to this rationale is that employers will be sufficiently deterred
by the prospect of nonemployee products liability claims.
91. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-112 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
92. Id. at 14-117 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
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held liable under the dual-capacity doctrine. Therefore, employers do
not acquire new obligations and liabilities outside of their usual course of
business. The interests of both employers and employees are served by
the dual-capacity doctrine under the Douglas rule. Injured employees
achieve protection under the products liability laws equal to that afforded the general public. Employers' liability for injuries caused by defective products is limited to those products for which a manufacturer
would expect to have products liability exposure.
5.

The Minnesota Approach

Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed the dualcapacity doctrine in the context of a products liability action against an
employer, Hennepin County District Court Judge Donald Barbeau did
so in the 1979 case of Nether/and. Acme Tag Co. 93 The plaintiff was injured, apparently by a machine manufactured by the defendant-employer. The plaintiff obtained workers' compensation benefits and then
sued the defendant under the dual-capacity doctrine for strict liability in
tort, breach of warranty, and negligence.
Judge Barbeau, noting that Minnesota had no case law on the subject,
presented a detailed outline of several significant dual-capacity cases
94
from other jurisdictions, emphasizing Douglas v. E. &J Gallo Winer.
Judge Barbeau, citing the Douglas rule, held that the present action was
barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Minnesota workers'
compensation statute because a sale to one outside company did not constitute manufacturing for sale to the general public.9 5 Therefore, under
Douglas, the most liberal dual-capacity decision, the doctrine did not apply.
Although Judge Barbeau applied dual-capacity case law to reach the
decision in the case, language at the end of the opinion raises doubts as to
his acceptance of the dual-capacity doctrine. Judge Barbeau stated:
Having found no Minnesota cases dealing with a situation such as
the present, this Court finds the need to rely upon the case law cited
above in deciding the motions now before it. Upon an examination of
the case law the Court must now order that plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice. Allowing the Complaint to stand would expand the application of the dual capacity doctrine to a point beyond
which even the most liberal decision known to this Court has allowed.
The Court is sympathetic to the plaintiffs injuries and distress, but it is
within the province of the legislature, and not of this Court, to modify
the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Law so as to allow the imposition of manufacturer's liability on employers. Plaintiffs cause of action
93. No. 753534 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 1979).

94. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). For a full discussion of Doug/as,
see notes 32-43 supra and accompanying text.
95. No. 753534, slip op. at 6.
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is barred by Minn. Stat. 176.031.96
Because the Netherland case fell outside basic dual-capacity theory,
Judge Barbeau did not have a proper factual opportunity to examine the
policy arguments underlying the application of the dual-capacity doctrine in a products liability setting. Therefore, whether the dual-capacity
doctrine will be applied in Minnesota is an open question. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not ruled on the dual-capacity issue. Nevertheless, recognition of the dual-capacity doctrine in products liability cases
appears consistent with Minnesota case law.
In Boek v. Wong Hzng,9 7 the defendant-employer intentionally and maliciously struck at the plaintiff-employee with a heavy broom handle, dislocating two finger joints on the hand that plaintiff held up to protect his
head. Intentional torts committed by an employer are covered by the
workers' compensation statute and are subject to the exclusive-remedy
provision. 98 The Minnesota Supreme Court held, however, that a plaintiff in such a case can elect either to sue at law or to obtain benefits under
the compensation statute. 99 The Boek court held that public policy
would not allow an employer to invoke the exclusive-remedy provision
and compensation ceiling of the workers' compensation statute to avoid
liability for intentional torts. 100 It is clear from the Boek holding that the
Minnesota Supreme Court is willing to recognize exceptions to the exclusive-remedy provision in the interest of public policy.
Consequently, an exception to the exclusive-remedy provision should
be recognized when an employee is injured by a defective product manufactured by his employer. Public policy demands that manufacturers of
defective products bear the full cost of such defects and that the manufacture of defective products be discouraged.1o' In the spirit of Boek and
for the reasons stated in the previous section, Minnesota should adopt the
dual-capacity doctrine and the Douglas rule in products liability cases.
B.

Provider of Medical Services

The 1952 California decision of Duprey v. Shane102 was the first case to
use dual-capacity principles when an employer also provides medical
services.103 Since Duprey a split of authority has occurred whether an
96. Id.
97. 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930).
98. See id. at 471, 231 N.W. at 233-34.
99. Id. at 471-72, 231 N.W. at 234; see Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa
Superior Court, - Cal. 3d -, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (employee entitled

to bring action against employer for aggravation of work-related injuries caused by employer's fraudulent concealment of asbestos-caused disease).
100.

180 Minn. at 471-72, 231 N.W. at 234.

101. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
102. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
103. See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
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employee can bring a common-law action against the employer for the
aggravation of work-related injuries when the employer provides medical
services.
1 7
Four jurisdictions, California,104 Ohio,105 Illinois,106 and New York, 0
have allowed common-law actions under the dual-capacity doctrine
against an employer who provides medical services. Three jurisdictions,
Tennessee,108 Mississippi,10 9 and Florida,1 to have rejected the dual-ca104. In D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, - Cal. 3d -, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1980), the court held that a county hospital employee could sue the county
because the hospital employees who treated the plaintiff were responsible for aggravating
a disease that plaintiff had contracted in the course of employment. The court held that
Duprey applied even though the county itself did not treat the plaintiff. Id. at -, 613 P.2d
at 242, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
105. Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978) (employee who contracted mercury poisoning sued employer-hospital for failure to diagnose
condition).
106. McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 77, 402 N.E.2d 412 (1980)
(suit against employer for malpractice of physician hired by employer allowed).
107. In Cline v. Avery Abrasives, Inc., 96 Misc. 2d 258, 409 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (action against employer's workers' compensation carrier for negligent inspection),
the court stated that under the dual-capacity doctrine an employee can sue the employerhospital for the aggravation of injuries sustained in the course of employment only when
such services are available generally to members of the public.
A series of New York cases that did not expressly address the dual-capacity doctrine is
the origin of the statement in Cline. In Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d
596 (1940), a nurse at a city hospital became ill after eating food while on duty. The
employee was treated at a nurses' infirmary and was given an adulterated injection that
resulted in the loss of the use of the nurse's entire arm. The Volk court held that the
common-law action against the city was not barred because it was an injury that did not
arise out of and in the course of employment. Id. at 283, 30 N.E.2d at 597. The court
stated: "It was a risk to which anyone receiving like treatment at the hospital would have
been subjected. The occurrence of the injury was not made more likely by the fact of her
employment." Id. The dissent stated that since the medical treatment was a part of the
employment contract, such an injury clearly arose out of and in the course of employment.
Id. at 287, 30 N.E.2d at 599 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). For two cases supporting Volk, see
Stevens v. County of Nassau, 56 A.D.2d 866, 392 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1977) (mem.) (food service employee who fell on hospital grounds sued hospital-employer for negligent treatment
of broken wrist); Sivertsen v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 698, 225 N.E.2d 572, 278 N.Y.S.2d 886
(1967) (employee at mental institution injured when stretcher broke while employee was
being transported to infirmary); cf. Garcia v. Iserson, 33 N.Y.2d 421, 309 N.E.2d 420, 353
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1974) (action against employer for malpractice of physician at nonpublic
infirmary on employer premises).
108. See McAlister v. Methodist Hosp., 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977) (hospital employee sued employer for negligent treatment of back injury), discussed in 8 MEMPHIS ST.
U.L. REv. 163 (1977). In McAlister the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that even though
the facts before the court were almost identical to those in Dupr, the action against the
employer was barred by the exclusive-remedy provision. Id. at 243-45. The court stated:
"The employer is the employer, not some person other than the employer. It is that simple." Id. at 246.
109. See Trotter v. Litton Systems, Inc., 370 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 1979) (infection caused
by negligence of personnel at employer's first aid station). The court relied upon McAlis-
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pacity doctrine in the context of employer-supplied medical services.",
In D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles,' 12 a county hospital employee's
work-related injury was aggravated by medical treatment at the hospital.
The defendant argued that since the county itself did not treat plaintiff,
Duprey was inapplicable. The court held that such a distinction is not
valid, because "in treating plaintiff's injuries the hospital did not act in
the capacity as employer but as a hospital, and since it assumed the obligations of a hospital to a patient it should be liable in that capacity
rather than as an employer for the aggravation of plaintiff's injury."113

Citing Deauville v. Hall, 114 the court distinguished the situation in which
an employer that is not in the business of supplying medical services hires
a physician or provides an in-house first aid clinic.'15 The following rule
may be gleaned from D'Angona: the dual-capacity doctrine applies when
the employer physically performs the medical service or is in the business
of providing medical services to the public in general.
Professor Larson takes a more conservative position. He argues that
the dual-capacity doctrine should apply only if the employer personally
performs medical service, as in Duprey.'1 6 Professor Larson argues furter v. Methodist Hosp., 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977) and Warwick v. Hudson Pulp &
Paper Co., 303 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
110. See Warwick v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., 303 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (aggravation of back injury at in-house clinic).
111. There are several cases that do not expressly deal with dual-capacity concepts,
but have particular relevance with respect to an employer providing medical services. See
Lindsay v. George Washington Univ., 279 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (maintenance man
employed by defendant negligently treated for work-related injury at hospital also owned
by defendant, action held barred); Hayes v. Marshall Field & Co., 351 Il. App. 329, 115
N.E.2d 99 (1953) (company physician pierced plaintiff's eye, action against employer held
barred); Vogel v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 221 Pa. Super. 157, 289 A.2d 158 (1972)
(work injury aggravated by medical clinic provided by employer, action against employer
held barred). The holdings in these cases are consistent with the general rule that a dual
capacity will not be found unless the employer is in the business of providing medical
services. See notes 112-20 nyra and accompanying text.
112. -Cal.
3d -, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980).
113. Id. at -, 613 P.2d at 242, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
114. 188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1961) (action against employer for negligence of employer's first-aid man in treating work-related injury held barred by workers'
compensation act).
115. - Cal. 3d at -, 613 P.2d at 243, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
116. Id. at -, 613 P.2d at 242, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 181. Professor Larson states:
When we come to the doctor-employer relation. . . . [t]he employer as employer is under a duty specifically imposed by the compensation act to provide
medical treatment. Normally he would do this by supplying a physician. If he
did so, and if the physician aggravated the injury by negligence, it is elementary
that the employer could not be sued by the employee in tort. Why, the defendant will ask, should the result be any different merely because the employer happens to be in a position to provide the services personally? The answer. . . lies
in the difference between providing services in the sense of paying for them, and
providing services by physically performing them. The doctor-patient relation,
with all the legal obligations that it entails, does not spring up as the result of an
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ther that there is a crucial difference between paying for services and
physically performing them; it is impossible to cause physical injury by
writing a check.7
Minnesota has yet to consider the dual-capacity doctrine in medical
service cases. There are important and appealing policy reasons for
adopting the D'Angona rule. First, the D'Angona rule parallels the rule in
products liability cases.1' 8 The employer will be held liable under the
dual-capacity doctrine only if the employer is in the business of manufacturing goods for or supplying services to the general public.t1 9 Therefore, employers do not acquire new obligations and liabilities outside of
their usual course of business. Second, both Douglas and D'Angona ensure
that employees who receive goods or services from the employer will not
be treated in a manner different from members of the public who receive
the same goods and services. Finally, both the obligation to provide adequate medical services and manufacture safe products are wholly unrelated to the employment relationship.120 For these reasons, Minnesota
should adopt the dual-capacity doctrine under the D'Angona rule.
C

Owner of Real Estate

Only four jurisdictions, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Iowa, have
addressed the issue of whether an employer who also occupies the position of an owner of property may be liable to an employee.121 The only
decision to have adopted the dual-capacity doctrine was the 1973 Illinois
essentially financial act-paying the doctor's bill. But it does spring up as the
result of undertaking to perform the medical treatment directly.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-117 to -118 (footnote omitted).
117. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Insurer As Suable Third Party, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1117,
1137.
118. The D'Angona rule explains the bulk of the cases in the medical service context.

See, e.g., Warwick v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., 303 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(employee treated in employer's in-house clinic; dual-capacity doctrine rejected); Trotter
v. Litton Systems, Inc., 370 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 1979) (employee treated in employer's firstaid station; dual-capacity doctrine rejected); Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30
N.E.2d 596 (1940) (nurse treated at employer's hospital; suit against employer allowed);

Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978) (hospital employee sues employer for failure to diagnose condition; dual-capacity doctrine adopted).
Two cases, however, deviate from the D'Angona rule. See McCormick v. Caterpillar

Tractor Co., 82 Il1. App. 3d 77, 402 N.E.2d 412 (1980) (employee sued employer for malpractice of medical practitioner hired by employer; employer held not immune); McAlister v. Methodist Hosp., 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977) (hospital treatment negligently
performed by other hospital employees; employer held immune).
119. See notes 34-43, 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
120. See id. But see MINN. STAT. § 176.135(1) (1978) (employer shall furnish medical
treatment).
121. Two other jurisdictions have touched upon an employer's common-law liability
for injuries to employees on land owned by the employer. See Kottis v. United States Steel
Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying Indiana law) (craneman killed on employer's
property, dual-capacity doctrine rejected); State v. Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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case of Marcus v. Green.122 In Marcus the plaintiff, a carpenter, was injured when some scaffolding collapsed during the construction of an
apartment building. The plaintiff was employed by a business solely
owned by the defendant, who was also a partner in the ownership of the
property where the accident occurred. The plaintiff received workers'
compensation benefits from the defendant employer and sued the partnership under the Illinois Structural Work Act.' 23 The Marcus court rejected the defendant's argument that workers' compensation was the
plaintiff's sole remedy, holding that the duty imposed under the Structural Work Act is distinct from the duty of an employer, thus allowing
the application of the dual-capacity doctrine.124
The rule established in Marcus was short lived. Three years later, the
same court, in Dintelman v. Granite Cqy Steel Co.,125 held that Marcus was
not a sweeping repeal of employer immunity, but a decision that allowed
a common-law suit against a separate legal entity that was not the statutory employer, that is, the partnership.126 A series of Illinois decisions
App. 1962) (general contractor who owned land on which independent contractor employee was injured not statutory employer).
122. 13 Il1. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (1973).
123. The Illinois Structural Work Act provides:
All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical
contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this
State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any
house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the
life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing
under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.
Scaffold, or staging, swung or suspended from an overhead support more
than twenty (20) feet from the ground or floor shall have, where practicable, a
safety rail properly bolted, secured and braced, rising a [at] least thirty-four (34)
inches above the floor or main portion of such scaffolding or staging, and extending along the entire length of the outside and ends thereof, and property
attached thereto, and such scaffolding or staging shall be so fastened as to prevent the same from swaying from the building or structure.
ILL. ANN. STAT.

ch. 48, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1969).

124. 13 IIl. App. 3d at 706-07, 300 N.E.2d at 517-18.
125. 35 Ill.
App. 3d 509, 341 N.E.2d 425 (1976).
126. Id. at 512, 341 N.E.2d at 427. In Minnesota, a partnership and its individual
partners are separate entities for the purpose of determining the statutory employer. See
Monson v. Arcand, 239 Minn. 336, 58 N.W.2d 753 (1953). In Monson the Minnesota
Supreme Court allowed a common-law action against the defendant partner for injuries
arising out of an automobile accident because the partnership and not the defendant partner was the employer according to the workers' compensation insurance policy. See 1d. at
340-41, 58 N.W.2d at 756-57.
The result in Monson may have been modified recently by legislative enactment of an
amendment to section 176.061, subdivision 5 of Minnesota Statutes: "A co-employee
working for the same employer is not liable for a personal injury incurred by another
employee unless the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the co-employee or was

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss3/8

22

et al.: Workers' Compensation: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine
1980]

THE DUAL-CAPACITY DOCTRINE

under the Structural Work Act subsequently denied the application of
Marcus and the dual-capacity doctrine.127 Although these cases did not
overrule Marcus, the Marcus decision was for all practical purposes lim8
ited out of existence.12
Louisiana has made it clear in several employer-owner cases that it is
up to the legislature to adopt the dual-capacity doctrine, and until that
29
time, the courts will find the doctrine inapplicable.1
No other courts have expressly addressed the dual-capacity doctrine in
the owner context. Iowa, however, without using the dual-capacity language, rejected an attempt by an injured worker to sue his employer for
injuries sustained on property owned by the employer when the property
was in no way connected with the employer's business.130 Similarly,
New York has consistently rejected attempts by employees to bring a
common-law action against their employer solely on the basis of the employer's ownership of property that contains the injury-causing instrumentality. 131
When an employer's second capacity is that of an owner of property,
intentionally inflicted by the co-employee." Act of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, § 31, 1979 Minn.
Laws Ex. Sess. 1256, 1272.
Under Monson if a partnership is the employer, then the individual partners can be
subject to a common-law suit. Under the circumstances in which a partner is not the
employer then the partner could be considered to be a coemployee of the other employees.
Therefore, under the amendment's language, an employee injured by a partner who is not
the statutory employer could not bring suit against the tortfeasor-partner unless the act
was intentional or caused by gross negligence.
127. Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 48 Il1. App. 3d 482, 363 N.E.2d 400 (1977); Kim
v. Raymond, 44 111.App. 3d 37, 358 N.E.2d 34 (1976); Walker v. Berkshire Foods, Inc., 41
Ill. App. 3d 595, 354 N.E.2d 626 (1976); Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 111. App.
3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976).
128. In 1979, however, the Illinois Supreme Court in Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary
Dist., 77 Il. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979), apparently revived Marcus and the dualcapacity doctrine.
129. See Herbert v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. 1979) (construction employee electrocuted when statutory employer failed to de-energize powerline
on property owned by employer; dual-capacity doctrine inapplicable); Finch v. Jordano,
284 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1973) (employee killed in sewer ditch cave-in on property owned
by employer).
130. Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1969).
131. Eg., Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585, 152 N.E.2d 59, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1958) (injury in car owned by employer); Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557
(1946) (suit against member of partnership who owned building where injury occurred);
Di Bernardo v. Heimroth, 58 A.D.2d 344, 396 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1977) (injury connected with
truck rented by employer); Minsky v. Baitelman, 281 A.D. 910, 120 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1953)
(mem.) (suit against partner who owned building where partnership did business); Winter
v. Peter Doelger Brewing Co., 175 A.D. 796, 162 N.Y.S. 469 (1916) (injury at building
coincidentally owned and controlled by employer), affdmem., 226 N.Y. 581, 123 N.E. 895
(1919); Costanzo v. Mackler, 34 Misc. 2d 188, 227 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct.) (injury connected with truck rented by employer), affd mem., 17 A.D.2d 948, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1016
(1962).
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the application of the dual-capacity doctrine becomes difficult to justify.
An employer has a duty to supply the employee with a safe working
environment. 132 This duty to provide relatively safe premises is identical
to the duty imposed upon landowners with regard to property entrants. 133 Because it cannot be said that the status as a landowner gives
rise to a duty independent of that imposed by the employer-employee
relationship, the dual-capacity doctrine should have no application.
However, when a statute imposes a duty upon the owner of property
distinct from any common-law duty, the dual-capacity doctrine may apply. 134

Almost no support exists for the adoption of the dual-capacity doctrine
when the employer's second capacity is that of an owner of property. For
the above-stated reasons, Minnesota should reject application of the
dual-capacity doctrine to employer-landowners.
D.

Insurer

Only three courts have discussed the liability of an employer under the
dual-capacity doctrine when an employer's second capacity is that of an
insurer. 135 In the Arizona Court of Appeals case of Denman v. Duval Sierria Corp.,136 the plaintiff brought a common-law action based on negligent inspection against the defendant-employer, in its capacity as a self132.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 526 (4th ed. 1971).
133. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118-19, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 104 (1968); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972).
Professor Larson has stated:
Similarly, it can at least be argued that the liability of the owner of the land
is different from that of an employer working on the premises. The legal doctrines governing the responsibilities of landowners to different classes of persons
entering upon the land are ancient and distinctive, and again are different in
quality and range from the rules governing the liability of a contractor to his
employees.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-117.
134. See notes 173-78 znfia and accompanying text.
135. In Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1972), the California Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the defendant
insurance company, which had used deceptive means to obtain information concerning
the extent of plaintiff's disability, was a statutory alter ego of the employer and thus immune from common-law liability or whether it had stepped outside its role as an insurer,
thus exposing itself to common-law liability. The court drew an analogy to Duprey and
held that the action was not barred since the insurer stepped out of its role as an insurer as
well as out of its statutory protection. Id. at 634-36, 498 P.2d at 1076-77, 102 Cal. Rptr. at
828-29. This case has limited value in support of the dual-capacity doctrine because the
defendant was not the plaintiff's employer. /nruh, however, does support the proposition
that a party who is immune from suit pursuant to the exclusive-remedy provision of a
workers' compensation statute can lose that immunity if that party steps outside the statutorily protected status. Therefore, even though it is not direct support for the dual-capacity doctrine, Unruh is at least analogous support.
136. 27 Ariz. App. 684, 558 P.2d 712 (1976).
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insurer, for injuries the plaintiff sustained in the course of employment.
The Denman court flatly rejected both the characterization of the employer-insurance carrier as a third party and the dual-capacity doctrine
itself, stating that the dual-capacity doctrine is without support in case
law or logic.13

7

Similarly, in Adair v. More//i-Harrah Marble Co.,138 the Alabama
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not sue his employer in its
capacity as a self-insurer for failing to perform adequate safety inspections. In rejecting the dual-capacity doctrine the court held that an employer cannot be a party "other than the employer."139 In Swain v.JL.
Hudson Co. ,140 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a self-insured
employer will not be considered to be a third party against whom an
employee can institute suit for failure to inspect and warn. 1 41
The cases that have rejected the dual-capacity doctrine when the employer's second capacity is that of a self-insurer have implicitly recognized that self-insurance is within the scope of employer activity.
Furthermore, the employee's cause of action is usually based on negligent
inspection of the premises. Because the employer has a duty to provide
safe working premises,142 taking on the role of an insurer does not give
rise to a duty independent of that imposed by the employer-employee
relationship. Thus, the dual-capacity doctrine should not apply. The
only situation in which the dual-capacity doctrine may apply is if the
employer is also in the business of providing insurance for the general
public. This result is consistent with the Douglas and D'Angona rules.
Unfortunately, no cases involving this fact situation have been decided.
Because it is difficult to separate the duties owed by an employer from
those owed by a self-insured employer, Minnesota should not apply the
dual-capacity doctrine to self-insurers.
E.

Corporate Subdivisions or Related Corporations

Courts have uniformly held that the operation of different divisions
within a corporation does not create separate capacities within the meaning of the dual-capacity doctrine. 143 Even California, which has adopted
137. Id. at 685, 558 P.2d at 713.
138. 381 So. 2d 181 (Ala. 1980).
139. Id. at 183.
140. 60 Mich. App. 361, 230 N.W.2d 433 (1975).
141. Id. at 363, 230 N.W.2d at 434.
142. W. PROSSER, supra note 132.
143. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Va. 1969) (plaintiff employed in painting division of shipyard sued design division for injuries); Stone v. United
States Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1980) (employee of corporate division of defendant
fell into chemical vat, defendant sued as owner of premises, held immune); Douglas v. E.
& J. Gallo Winery, 60 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (1977) (dicta);
Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., - Mass. -, -, 408 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1980)
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the dual-capacity doctrine in other situations, does not apply the doctrine to mere separations or divisions within the same corporation.144
The only cases that have allowed an employee's common-law suit against
a corporate subdivision or related corporation are those in which the subdivision or corporation is held to be an entity separate from the employer; thus the case is taken outside the exclusive-remedy provision and
45
the principles of the dual-capacity doctrine.'

A good argument nevertheless may be made in favor of imposing common-law liability on an employer when a separate division of the employer's business causes an employee's injury. In Mercer v. Uniroyal,
Inc.,146

the court stated:

In recent years, corporations and employers have entered a variety of
fields and economic factors have promoted diversification rather than
specialization. Conglomerates have become the rule. A corporation's
economic structure should not dictate the right of the injured to recover or that each new corporate merger erases a like number of causes
147
of action.
(employee injured by defective machinery manufactured by a separate division of the
employer, held immune); Hudson v. Allen, 11 Mich. App. 511, 513-14, 161 N.W.2d 596,
598-99 (1968) (drugstore employee injured at laundromat also owned by employer); Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp., 150 N.J. Super. 48, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977) (employee of
corporate division sued another corporate division for the manufacture of a defective
chemical vat, held immune). But see Davis, Workmen's Compensation-Using an Enterprn~e
Theory of Employment to Determine Who Is a Third Party Tort-Feasor, 32 U. Pir. L. REv. 289
(1971) (third-party actions should be allowed when plaintiff employed by one enterprise is
injured by another separate enterprise even if a division of one corporate entity).
Professor Larson comments: "One thing is clear. Dual capacity will not be found
merely because the employer has a number of departments or divisions that perhaps are
quite separate in their functions and operations." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at
14-115 (footnote omitted).
144. See Douglas v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109,137 Cal. Rptr. 797,
800 (1977).
145. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979) (applying
Kentucky law); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965) (under Maryland
law corporation not immune when plaintiff injured in truck with defective brakes owned
by wholly owned subdivision); Daisernia v. Co-Operative G.L.F. Holding Corp., 26
A.D.2d 594, 270 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966) (per curiam) (wholly owned subsidiary held not
immune from suit by parent employee). For a different viewpoint leading to immunity,
see Potts v. Knox-Tenn Rental, Inc., 467 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. App. 1970) (plaintiff held to
be engaged in dual employment).
146. 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
147. Id. at 285-86, 361 N.E.2d at 496 (footnotes omitted). The Mercer court's opinion
set forth some interesting statistics:
From 1955 to 1959, there was an annual average of 1,162 mergers. From 1960 to
1969, there were 1,664 mergers annually and by 1967 through 1969 there was an
average of 3,605 mergers per year. Between 1962 and 1968, 110 of Fortune's 500
industrials were absorbed by mergers. See M. Green, B. Moore & B. Wasserstein, The Closed Enterprise System (1972), at pp. 10-11.
Id. at 286 n.2, 361 N.E.2d at 496 n.2.
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In accord with Mercer, one author observed:
In today's complex business world we often find industry or government involved in a multiplicity of business functions. It is not at all
uncommon for a parent or conglomerate corporation to exist as a shell
for numerous businesses manufacturing hundreds of different products
148
or performing a like number of services.
Fairness and an acceptance of the realities of the business world require the recognition of the dual-capacity doctrine in Minnesota and
elsewhere. If a corporate subdivision is in fact separate and independent,
even though by law it is part of one corporate organism, to limit an injured employee to the generally inadequate workers' compensation remedy merely on the basis of corporate structure would be inequitable.49
An employer's common-law liability should not be determined by the
employer's ability to acquire the corporations that may cause injury to
the employee.1 50 Even though an employee may have given up a common-law right of recovery against the immediate employer, that employee should not necessarily be required to relinquish that right as
against possibly unknown, nonimmediate employers, when the employee
may not have assumed or contemplated the risks of the employer's work.
F

Government Subdivisions

As with corporate subdivisions or related corporations, courts have
consistently held that an employee of one governmental division cannot
sue that employer when another governmental division causes the employee to suffer injuries compensable under workers' compensation
acts. 151 Although the application of the dual-capacity doctrine to different governmental subdivisions is not generally supported, persuasive ar148. Bradshaw, The "Duel-Capacity" [sic] Doctrine: Employer Trt Lzabihly for Certain
Work-Related Injuries, MINN. TR. LAW., July 1978, at 6.
t49. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 661-63 (6th Cir. 1979) (apply-

ing Kentucky law).
150. For example, a manufacturer of defectively designed punch presses could limit itb
products liability exposure by acquiring those companies that are its largest customers.
151. See Miller v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Va. 1969) (divisions within
government shipyard); State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979) (suit for failure to properly maintain highway on which car accident occurred); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery,
69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) (dicta); Walker v. City & County of San
Francisco, 97 Cal. App. 2d 901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950) (pre-Duprey decision, see note 1 supra)
(member of city fire department killed when hit by city streetcar); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1962) (employee of Department of Highways hit by state
trooper); Wright v. Moore, 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1979) (employee of Department of
Health sued state for malfunctioning street signal); Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 477,
247 N.W. 714 (1933) (city fireman killed by city streetcar); De Giuseppe v. City of New
York, 188 Misc. 897, 66 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (city sanitation department em-

ployee injured by city owned and operated streetcar), afd mem., 273 A.D. 1010, 79
N.Y.S.2d 163 (1948); Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979)
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guments have been made in support of the dual-capacity doctrine. One
author observed:
[A] governmental agency may have a vast number of employees and
separate departments or divisions, each acting independent of the other
and completely separate with respect to basic function and area of responsibility. Often an employee functioning in one department or division is injured as a result of malfeasance of another department or
division, albeit on the job. Under these circumstances should the employer be shielded from tort liability by the worker's comp exclusive
52

remedy principle? 1

In McDonough v. Miller,153 a case from the First District of Minnesota,
Le Sueur County, the plaintiff, an administrator for the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, was driving alone in a state-owned vehicle.
The defendant, who was driving in the opposite direction, lost control of
her car and collided with plaintiff's car because of the eroded condition
of the shoulder of the highway. Plaintiff, who was severely injured,
brought suit against the defendant. Because the defendant's insurance
policy had a liability coverage ceiling of only $25,000, the plaintiff sued
the State of Minnesota Highway Department under the dual-capacity
doctrine. Although the plaintiff's medical specials came to $15,000 and
it was anticipated that the plaintiff would be able to return to work
about a year and a half after the accident, the plaintiff obtained over
$75,000 as a settlement from the state in addition to workers' compensa(county road department employee sued for failure to properly construct and maintain
county road).
In State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979), the court stated:
Whatever frail vitality the dual capacity doctrine has in other jurisdictions,
we do not think that it warrants adoption here. To do so might undermine
extensively the policy sought to be achieved by the workmen's compensation act.
There are endlessly imaginable situations in which an employer might owe duties to the general public, or to non-employees, the breach of which would be
asserted to avoid the exclusive liability provision of our statute. It would be an
enormous, and perhaps illusory, task to draw a principled line of distinction between those situations in which the employee could sue and those in which he
could not. The exclusive liability provision would, in any event, lose much of its
effectiveness, and the workmen's compensation system as a whole might be destabilized.
Id. at 260.
Professor Larson has stated:
One thing is clear. Dual capacity will not be found merely because the
employer has a number of departments or divisions that perhaps are quite separate in their functions and operations. The question has arisen most frequently
as to governments. Attempts have several times been made to subdivide a municipality, and assert common-law rights on behalf of an employee of one city
department as if it were a stranger. These attempts have been consistently unsuccessful.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.80, at 14-115 to -116 (footnote omitted).
152. Bradshaw, supra note 148, at 6.
153. An account of this case by the plaintiff's attorney is found at Bradshaw, supra note
148, at 6-7; Bradshaw, Our Members Report:, MINN. TR. LAw., June 1978, at 12, 16-18.
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tion benefits and $25,000 from defendant's insurance carrier.154
The plaintiff's attorney asserted that the state settled because it feared
liability under the dual-capacity doctrine. Even though the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not yet applied the doctrine, the plaintiff's analysis of
the case under the dual-capacity doctrine is instructive and persuasive:
First, it is clear that the function of the State of Minnesota Highway
Department was separate and distinct from that of the Department of
Public Welfare. These departments originate from completely different offices. The functions and purposes of the two departments are
completely separate and in no way overlap. Joe McDonough was not
in any way associated with the Highway Department in his employment.

As to the second criterion of the rule, it is clear that the State of
Minnesota owes a duty to the public relative to the safety of its roadways. See, Minnesota State Constitution Article XIV and MSA
§161.114 (requiring the state to maintain Minnesota State Highway
# 13 as a public highway for the purpose of providing a "reasonable
means of communication"); and Neittng v. Blond/I, 235 NW2d 597
155
(1975) and MSA §3.736 (on abrogation of sovereign immunity).
In respect to these principles, Joe McDonough was in an identical
position with any other vehicle operator or passenger on the road. His
need for a state roadway was neither more nor less than that of the
remainder of the public. Another close analogy which may be drawn
to the Douglas [v. E &J. Gallo Winery] decision is that the roadway is in

every sense a "product" which is furnished by the State to the public,
just as the scaffolding furnished by defendant in the Douglas case was a
product. When Mr. McDonough undertook his employment with the
Department of Public Welfare, he naturally assumed all the hazards
and risks which would normally flow from his relationship with his immediate employer, but he certainly did not foresee that his "employer"
would somehow injure him through its negligence in a completely distinct capacity. Thus, in accordance with the rationale of the Douglas
case, he should not be held to have [given] up his rights with respect to
156
the function of the State of Minnesota as keeper of the highways.
154. Bradshaw, supra note 148, at 6-7.

155. The existence of a duty owed by the Department of Transportation to the plaintiff may be questioned in light of Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801
(Minn. 1979), discussed in Comment, Mun'cipal Tort Liabiaiy and the Pubic Duty Rule: A
Matter of Statutog Anal'ysis, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 391 (1980). Under Cracraft a statutory duty owed to the public in general without some special relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant cannot be the basis of a negligence action against the state or a
municipality. See 279 N.W.2d at 806-08. Even under more traditional applications of the
law of negligence per se, there might not be a statutory duty because the statute was

intended to provide a reasonable means of transportation and not to protect travelers from
injury. See Comment, supra, at 397-400. In any event, the probable absence of liability for
negligently maintaining state highways in this case should not be regarded as undermin-

ing the validity of the dual-capacity doctrine in an appropriate fact situation.
156. Bradshaw, supra note 148, at 10-11.
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Many of the same reasons that compel adoption of the dual-capacity
doctrine in the corporate subdivision context also apply to the government subdivision context. Although an employee may have given up his
common-law right of recovery against his immediate employing division,
relinquishment of that right should not be required when the employee
may not have assumed or contemplated the risks generated by other governmental divisions. Based on this unassumed-risk principle and the reasons stated above, Minnesota should adopt the dual-capacity doctrine in
the government subdivision context.
G. Vendor
Michigan is the only jurisdiction that has considered the application of
the dual-capacity doctrine to the situation in which the employer is also
the employee's vendor.'17 In Panagos v. North Detroit GeneralHospital,158
the plaintiff, defendant's employee, cut her mouth while eating pie
purchased in defendant's cafeteria. The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits and sued the hospital alleging that the vendor-vendee
relationship created an independent ground for recovery. The Panagos
court held that the employee was not precluded from suing her employer.

159

In a subsequent Michigan Court of Appeals case, Neal v. Roura Iron
Works, Inc.,160 the court dismissed plaintiff's breach of warranty suit
against the defendant-employer, which sold plaintiff a glove that became
caught in a drill press, as a result of which the plaintiff's right arm was
amputated. The Neal court acknowledged that if an employer acts in
several different and unrelated capacities, an employee may have two
distinct remedies.1 61 The court distinguished Panagos, however, stating
that the employee-employer relationship must be entirely unrelated or
only incidently related to the ground for the separate cause of action. 162
The Neal court noted that the accident could not have occurred had the
plaintiff not been an employee.1 63 To prevent a flood of products liability suits against employers and to avoid the weakening of the exclusiveremedy provision, a suit against the employer was not allowed when the
employer's separate capacity was related to the employer-employee rela157. There are, however, cases that discuss the issue only in a conclusory fashion. See,
e.g., De Stefano v. Alpha Lunch Co., 308 Mass. 38, 30 N.E.2d 827 (1941) (workers' compensation exclusive remedy for adulterated food served to restaurant employee when the
employee made no reservation of common-law rights).
158. 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971).
159. ld. at 559, 192 N.W.2d at 544.
160. 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975).
161. Id. at 276 n.2, 238 N.W.2d at 838 n.2.
162. Id. at 277-78, 238 N.W.2d at 840.
163. Id. at 278, 238 N.W.2d at 840.
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164

Neal and Panagos may be reconciled according to principles discussed
earlier in this Note. In Panagos the defendant was in the business of running a hospital as well as a hospital cafeteria. Allowing the plaintiff to
sue her employer is consistent with the dual-capacity doctrine under
Douglas v. E &J. Gallo Winzeqy1 65 and D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles.166
Those cases recognized that the dual-capacity doctrine will apply only if
the employer is in the business of supplying the injury-causing goods or
services. 167 In contrast, the employer in Meal was not in the business of
selling gloves and therefore under the Douglas and D'Angona rules the
dual-capacity doctrine does not apply.
Many of the policy reasons used to justify the dual-capacity doctrine
in the products liability setting also may be used to justify it in the vendor-vendee context. When an employer sells a product to an employee a
new relationship is created. Vendors of products have a duty to supply
nondefective goods.' 68 Even if the vendor is not the manufacturer of the
goods, the vendor is still liable to the vendee for defective goods that
cause injuries169 because a vendor gives an implied warranty of fitness
when a product is sold. 170 In addition, public policy dictates that con-

sumers should not be required to bear the loss when a manufacturer cannot be found or is judgment proof because the vendor is in a better
position to distribute the costs of an injury.
When the vendor-vendee relationship is merged with the employeremployee relationship, the policies that require vendor liability clash
with the employer immunity provided by workers' compensation statutes. The reasons for imposing liability on the employer-vendor for the
sale of defective products are not as compelling as the reasons for imposing liability when the employer also manufacturers the product. The
imposition of liability on a vendor of a defective product does not substantially further the public's interest in deterring the manufacture of
such products. If the defect is not readily discoverable, the employervendor is unable to protect against defective products. The consumeremployee, however, relies upon the implied respresentations of the employer-vendor that the product is safe.
Even though workers' compensation benefits reduce the amount of an
employee's loss, those benefits usually do not provide full compensa164. Id.
165. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
166. - Cal. 3d -, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980).
167. See notes 34-43, 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
168. See generally Prosser, The Implied Warrany of MerchantableQuality, 27 MINN. L. REV.
117 (1943).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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tion.1 7 1 Therefore, the issue of liability turns on who should or is best
able to bear the loss, the employer-vendor or the employee-vendee. Because an employer-vendor normally is better able to spread the cost of
such losses'by charging higher prices, an employer-vendor should bear
the loss. 172 Consequently, Minnesota should adopt the dual-capacity
doctrine in the employer-vendor context.
H

Statutory Duty

Only three courts have discussed the conflict that occurs when the ex-

clusive-remedy provision of a workers' compensation statute prevents a
lawsuit against an employer although another statute allows such a
suit.' 73 In Mazurek v. Skarr,17 4 the plaintiff, a national guardsman, was
injured as a result of the negligence of another guardsman. The plaintiff
sought recovery under both the workers' compensation statute and under
a Wisconsin statute requiring the state to pay a judgment entered against
a guardsman acting in good faith. The Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed recovery under both statutes, stating that "[t]he state is herein
wearing two hats, that of employer and that required of it under [the
statute]."7)75
76
A New York court, however, took a different view. In Naso v. Lafata,1
the plaintiff was injured in an accident while being driven home in a car
owned by the defendant-employer. The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits. The Naso court held that the workers' compensation
statute was the only remedy available, notwithstanding a New York stat-

171. See note 12 supra.
172. It could be argued that the implied warranty of a vendor is subsumed under the
implied warranty of an employer to provide a safe place to work and to provide safe
working materials. Since a vendor cannot be deterred from manufacturing defective
products and since there would be no independent duty upon a vendor-employer to supply safe working materials, it is arguable that the dual-capacity doctrine should not apply.
173. In Illinois a long line of cases held that an employee who recovers under the
workers' compensation act cannot sue his employer under the Illinois Structural Work Act
(which establishes a standard of care for the erection and maintenance of scaffolding, see
2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524
note 123 supra). See Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 Ill.
2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976) (workers'
(1979); Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill.
compensation act grants immunity to immediate employers only, not someone who is required to pay under the act); Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 13 11. 2d 460, 150
N.E.2d 141 (1958); Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 48 II1. App. 3d 482, 363 N.E.2d 400
(1977); Kim v. Raymond, 44 Il1. App. 3d 37, 358 N.E.2d 34 (1976); Rosales v. Verson
App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976); Dintelman v. Granite City
Allsteel Press Co., 41 Ill.
App.
App. 3d 509, 341 N.E.2d 425 (1976). But see Marcus v. Green, 13 Ill.
Steel Co., 35 Ill.
3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (1973) (duty imposed under the Structural Work Act is separate
from an employer's duty under the workers' compensation act). For a discussion of Marcus, see notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text.
174. 60 Wis. 2d 420, 210 N.W.2d 691 (1973).
175. Id. at 427, 210 N.W.2d at 694.
176. 4 N.Y.2d 585, 152 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
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ute imposing liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligence of any
person operating the vehicle with the owner's permission.177 The court
stated that to hold otherwise would be to disregard the exclusive-remedy
78

provision of the statute. 1

Even though the duty is imposed by statute as opposed to the common
law the difference is not important to the operation of the dual-capacity
doctrine. The essential question still is whether the statutory duty arises
independent of the employer-employee relationship. Although the bare
language of the statute is available for interpretation, statutory language
can be just as amorphous as any common-law principle.
It is difficult to draw any conclusion from Mazurek and Naso. The underlying principle, however, appears to be that if the essential purpose of
the statute would be thwarted, the exclusive-remedy provision will be
preempted. For example, in Mazurek, the court held that to allow the
exclusive-remedy provision to exempt the state from liability would be
contrary to the express language of the statute. In contrast, the statute in
Naso was a general liability statute that would give way under general
rules of statutory construction to the more specific workers' compensation statute. In short, the dual-capacity doctrine in the statutory context
becomes a matter of statutory interpretation. Because the duties imposed by statutes are varied, it is impossible to reach any general conclusion on the applicability of the dual-capacity doctrine.
IV.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

If the dual-capacity doctrine is applied, the issue arises whether an
employer is entitled to a setoff from any common-law recovery in the
amount of workers' compensation benefits paid or payable. Every jurisdiction that has addressed this question has required a setoff.179 This
requirement is based on the principle that a party should not be entitled
to a double recovery. 180
The California Supreme Court in D'Angona v. County of Los AngelesI8 t
held that a county hospital employee could sue the county for the aggravation of injuries received in the course of employment. The court
stated, "[t]herefore, to the extent that the award made in her favor by
the Worker's Compensation Appeal Board reflects benefits afforded for
177. Id. at 590-91, 152 N.E.2d at 61-62.
178. Id.
179. Barber v. New England Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806, 813 & n.39 (Alaska 1973); Unruh
v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 636, 498 P.2d 1063, 1077-78, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 829-30
(1972); Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Il.2d 437, 447, 359 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1976);
Neal v. Roura Iron Works, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 273, 276 n.2, 238 N.W.2d 837, 839 n.2
(1975).
180. See note 179 supra.
181. - Cal. 3d -, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980).
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the aggravation of her injuries . . . the county is entitled to a set-off
"182

In Barber v. New England Fzsh Co. ,183 an injured longshoreman collected
workers' compensation benefits and brought a common law action alleging that his injuries were caused by a vessel's unseaworthiness. The
Alaska Supreme Court stated that if benefits are paid by one insurer and
the judgment is paid by another insurer, the employer can retain from
the judgment any funds necessary to reimburse the compensation carrier. 184 Under Alaska law, a common-law judgment is the primary
source of funds out of which damages to an injured worker are to be
paid, while workers' compensation benefits are a secondary.source. This
is consistent with the employee not needing to establish negligence to
recover workers' compensation benefits. The party proven to be at fault
logically should be the primary bearer of the employee's loss.
V.

CONCLUSION

The essential aim of the dual-capacity doctrine is to prevent injured
employees from receiving less protection from the law than does the general public merely because they are employees. For this reason, the dualcapacity doctrine should not be viewed as a devastating inroad into the
workers' compensation scheme.
Several general rules consistently appear in the dual-capacity decisions. An employee who suffers an injury that arises out of and in the
course of employment may both sue the employer for those injuries and
collect workers' compensation benefits only if that employer is in the
business of supplying the injury-causing product or service to the public
in general. This rule, however, does not apply in the corporate and governmental subdivision contexts or in the statutory context. In cases in
which the employer is a corporate or governmental subdivision, the dualcapacity doctrine always should apply because of the unassumed-risk
principle. In the statutory context, the dual-capacity doctrine should apply only if the essential purpose of the statute would be subverted by the
exclusive-remedy provision. By reducing the employer's opportunity to
avoid full economic responsibility through the exclusive-remedy provision, the dual-capacity doctrine returns a workers' compensation statute
to its status as a compensation law rather than a grant of employer immunity.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at -, 613 P.2d at 243, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973).
Id. at 807, 813 & n.13.
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